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ABSTRACT
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strong incentives to modify product designs so as to raise price by strengthening market segmentation.
Firms may also forego socially beneficial product improvements in the post-entry equilibrium, because
they intensify price competition too much. Multi-product monopoly can lead to better design incentives
than the non-cooperative pricing that prevails under competition.
Steven J. Davis Kevin M. Murphy Robert H. Topel
Graduate School of Business Graduate School of Business Graduate School of Business
University of Chicago University of Chicago University of Chicago
1101 E. 58
th Street 1101 E. 58
th Street 1101 E. 58
th Street
Chicago, IL 60637 Chicago, IL 60637 Chicago, IL 60637
and NBER and NBER and NBER
Tel: 773-702-7312 Tel: 773-702-7280 Tel: 773-702-7524
Fax: 773-702-0458 Fax: 773-702-2699 Fax: 773-702-2699
Email: sjd@gsbsjd.uchicago.edu Email: murphy@gsbkma.uchicago.edu Email: robert.topel@gsb.uchicago.edu  1
 
1   Introduction 
 
This paper studies entry, pricing and product design incentives in a market with 
differentiated products. In our model, an incumbent monopolist and a potential rival vie 
for sales to heterogeneous consumers, and the incumbent may either accommodate entry 
or price to exclude the rival.  Successful entry yields complete displacement of the 
incumbent or, more interestingly, coexistence in a separating equilibrium where 
consumers choose between rival products based on relative valuations. We show that an 
incumbent monopolist raises price in response to entry under plausible conditions, and 
that entry can reduce welfare. Entry can harm consumers by inducing a misallocation of 
goods to buyers, by segmenting the market in a way that transfers surplus to producers, 
and by undermining the incumbent’s willingness to price aggressively.   
In contrast, potential entry is highly beneficial to consumers when it elicits an 
“exclusionary” pricing response by the incumbent. The incumbent then retains the entire 
market, but only by pricing low enough to preclude rival sales. Reminiscent of the 
“contestable markets” paradigm of Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982), this exclusionary 
outcome also fits the situation in which the potential entrant operates in a market 
“adjacent” to the incumbent's. The key point is that the threat of entry (or expansion) 
constrains the incumbent's price, even though the incumbent retains its market. 
Exclusionary pricing is not always attractive to the incumbent, however; a 
stronger rival with a better product can compel the incumbent to accommodate entry and 
retreat to less aggressive pricing behavior.  In our model, entry always causes a fall in 
consumer surplus relative to an exclusionary pricing regime and sometimes relative to a 
pure monopoly regime with no rival. Entry can reduce total surplus relative to either pre-
entry regime. It follows that high market share is a poor indicator of monopoly pricing 
power, consumer harm, and inefficiency. 
We also analyze post-entry product design incentives for the incumbent and its 
rival.  Once an entrant establishes a secure market position, both firms have strong 
incentives to modify product designs in ways that strengthen market segmentation and 
weaken price competition, thereby transferring surplus from consumers to producers. A 
firm can soften price competition by making its product more attractive to its own   2
customers without making it too much more attractive to its rival’s customers. Under 
some circumstances, a firm willingly degrades product quality in the eyes of all 
consumers in order to soften price competition.  More generally, in an environment with 
differentiated products, the “direction” of design modifications greatly influences the 
intensity of price competition.  This influence on pricing distorts innovation incentives 
relative to a consumer surplus or total surplus benchmark.   
Adverse design incentives can also arise when a single firm sells both products, 
but we show that adverse incentives are often weaker under multi-product monopoly than 
under non-cooperative pricing with two firms. This result reflects an important difference 
between monopoly and non-cooperative pricing with differentiated products: by 
coordinating the pricing structure among imperfect substitutes, a multi-product 
monopolist is better able to extract surplus without resorting to inferior product designs.  
Our analysis is most apt for markets with heterogeneous consumers and a few 
distinct locations in product space. Market segmentation is a natural consequence of entry 
in this type of environment. Perhaps the best-known example of entry-induced 
segmentation involves the impact of generic equivalents when a brand name prescription 
drug goes off patent. Post entry, the branded version typically retains a large market share 
while selling for a much higher price than its generic equivalents. There is also evidence 
that generic entry often triggers an increase in the brand price, although empirical studies 
differ on this issue.
1 On a related front, Perloff, Suslow and Sequin (1996) find mixed 
price responses to entry by new anti-ulcer prescription drugs. Their evidence suggests 
that price rises for an incumbent drug in response to entry by a distant therapeutic 
substitute but falls in response to entry by a closer substitute. This mixed pattern fits our 
theory, which predicts that the price response of the incumbent depends on relative 
positions in product space, consumer preferences and the distribution of consumer types.   
Other markets also show evidence of entry-induced price increases. For example, 
Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) infer that variable profit margins rise modestly when a 
second new car dealership (typically Ford) enters an isolated rural market formerly 
served by a single dealership (typically General Motors). This finding suggests that a 
                                                           
1 See, for example, Caves et al. (1991), Grabowski and Vernon (1992) and Frank and Salkever (1997). 
Frank and Salkever provide the most compelling evidence that generic entry triggers higher prices for 
chemically equivalent brand name prescription drugs.      3
second dealership leads to greater segmentation in the local retail market and larger 
markups over wholesale prices. Ward et al. (2001) study the impact of private-label entry 
and market penetration on brand name pricing for 32 food product categories (e.g., baked 
beans, peanut butter, canned hams and gelatin mixes). Using scanner data on retail prices 
during the late 1990s, they find a strong positive effect of private-label market share on 
brand name prices in many categories. They also compile anecdotal evidence of brand 
name price cuts in response to private-label entry.   
Our analysis speaks to certain issues that arose in connection with United States v. 
Microsoft and the many class-action suits that followed in its wake. The government case 
drew attention to a pricing puzzle: Reasonable calculations place the static monopoly 
price of Microsoft Windows at several hundred dollars per copy, but the average price of 
Windows to computer manufacturers has been only about $60 in recent years (Reddy et 
al., 1999). No single factor is likely to explain this huge gap between actual and 
monopoly prices, but our analysis suggests that the presence of IBM’s OS/2 during the 
first half of the 1990s, and Linux more recently, may have played a role – despite small 
market shares or niche status – by prompting Microsoft to price Windows so as to 
prevent expansion by rivals. 
An important issue in the class-action suits is whether additional entry (or 
expansion by existing rivals) would have meant lower prices for Microsoft Windows or 
MS-DOS. Our analysis shows that additional entry could trigger higher prices by 
segmenting the market.  This conclusion holds whether or not exclusionary behavior 
influenced the actual prices of Windows and MS-DOS. The conclusion is reinforced 
insofar as entry-induced segmentation would create incentives to further soften price 
competition by suitable changes in product design. 
More generally, our analysis highlights a crucial distinction between the exclusion 
of rival sales through aggressive pricing or product design and the exclusion of rivals 
from the competitive process. Aggressive pricing by a leading firm benefits consumers, 
even when it excludes rivals from all or most of the market. Indeed, exclusionary pricing 
with high market share by a leading firm can be symptomatic of a highly competitive 
environment. Likewise, we show that “exclusionary” own-product design changes are   4
pro-competitive in our model. That is, own-product improvements aimed at the exclusion 
of rival sales unambiguously benefit consumers. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly reviews related theoretical 
work. Section 3 lays out the basic framework of the model and defines the equilibrium 
concept. Section 4 derives the post-entry pricing equilibrium and shows that it may 
involve market segmentation with sales by both firms, or exclusionary pricing and sales 
by a single firm. Section 5 analyzes the relationship between market structure and 
efficiency, and Section 6 analyzes product design incentives in the post-entry 
equilibrium. Section 7 draws on the preceding sections to analyze the impact of entry on 
pricing. Section 8 considers multi-product monopoly and compares it to the duopoly 
market structure, and Section 9 concludes. 
 
 
2   Related Theoretical Work 
 
D'Aspremont et al. (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Economides (1986) 
show that rival firms have strong incentives to produce differentiated products in order to 
soften price competition.  We obtain a similar result under a different demand structure 
and using a different equilibrium concept.  Our characterization of consumer demand and 
the product space is very simple but also more flexible than earlier work.
2 Tirole (1988, 
chapter 7) analyzes pricing and product location in a variety of models with product 
differentiation.  He emphasizes pre-entry location decisions, while we emphasize post-
entry design incentives.  We briefly discuss pre-entry design incentives in the concluding 
section.  
Judd (1985) considers a multi-product monopolist in a model of spatial 
competition. In his model, entry by a single-product firm can prompt the monopolist to 
withdraw its nearby product offering, because a price war between close substitutes 
would lower margins across the incumbent’s entire product line. In our model, the 
                                                           
2 D'Aspremont et al. reconsider Hotelling's problem of location on a line, while Economides (1986) 
considers location on a circular city. In these setups, a firm cannot change its product location to raise its 
value to some consumers without also reducing its value to others. In Shaked and Sutton's model, in 
contrast, products have the same quality ordering among all potential customers. For our demand structure, 
products may or may not have a unique quality ranking among customers, and product design changes may 
or may not affect all consumer valuations in the same direction.   5
incumbent monopolist may also concede a segment of the market in response to entry. 
Hence, both analyses identify forces that compel the incumbent to retreat in the face of 
entry.  The nature of the retreat differs, however, as do the consequences. For example, in 
our model the incumbent may retreat even when every consumer prefers the incumbent’s 
good. 
Product differentiation as a tool of price discrimination for multi-product 
monopolists is a central theme in many studies. Deneckere and McAfee (1996) provide 
several striking real-world examples, whereby the firm incurs extra costs to turn a high-
end product into a lower quality version. They show that this seemingly perverse 
behavior can generate a Pareto improvement by raising profit, expanding the market and 
lowering the price on the high-end product. We show how entry into an initially 
monopolized market can lead to a non-cooperative form of price discrimination. We also 
show that monopoly can lead to better design incentives than duopoly.    
Perloff et al. (1996) show that entry can cause an incumbent monopolist's price to 
rise or fall in a model of spatial competition.  The incumbent's price declines when the 
entrant locates sufficiently “close” to the incumbent in product space, rises when the 
entrant locates farther away, and remains unchanged if the two products are sufficiently 
distant.  Similar effects arise in our model, but our demand structure yields a different 
concept of distance.  Our model also yields additional results; for example, an incumbent 
may price low to exclude the entrant, and successful entry can reduce welfare by 
inducing a misallocation of goods to consumers and altering design incentives. 
Mussa and Rosen (1978) provide a rather different perspective on entry in a 
market with differentiated products.  They analyze the monopoly supply of goods on a 
one-dimensional quality spectrum. They also compare the monopoly outcome to a 
competitive ideal with marginal cost pricing and positive supply at each point along an 
endogenous (and efficient) quality interval.  Competition, unlike monopoly, maximizes 
efficiency and consumer surplus in their model.  Thus, an idealized form of competition 
is better than the monopoly supply of differentiated products.  For reasons outside their 
model, this form of competition may be infeasible or undesirable.  Product development 
costs, fixed operating costs, transport costs and agglomeration or network effects all 
militate against an outcome with positive supply throughout the relevant portions of the   6
product space. As a result, markets with product differentiation often involve few firms 
producing at few locations.  Limited competition of this form can yield outcomes that are 
inferior to monopoly, as our analysis shows. 
Other related work is explicitly motivated by the low price of Microsoft 
Windows. Reddy et al. (1999) adapt the standard monopoly pricing formula to account 
for the follow-on sales of complementary Microsoft software applications generated by 
sales of Windows.  They show that the monopoly price of Windows remains much higher 
than the observed price under reasonable assumptions about demand.  Hall (2000) 
considers a vertical structure that emphasizes the potential for entry by downstream 
purchasers of Microsoft Windows such as the Dell and Compaq computer companies.  
Although the structure of Hall's model differs greatly from ours, he also finds that 
potential entry can sharply curtail the incumbent's price, and that high market share is a 
poor indicator of monopoly pricing power.  Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) develop a 
model of limit pricing by the monopoly supplier of a network good. They show that the 
possibility of future entry encourages the incumbent monopolist to lower its current price 
so as to enlarge its installed customer base.  In turn, a larger customer base lowers the 
demand facing a future entrant, which makes entry less attractive.  Davis, Murphy and 
Topel (2001b) show that a similar motive for low pricing by an incumbent monopolist 
arises when consumption involves learning by doing.  
 
 
3   A Model of Differentiated Products 
 
Costs, Demand Structure, and Product Space 
 
Consider a market with two types of consumers, one incumbent firm and, 
possibly, one rival who may or may not enter.  Firms produce at zero marginal cost and 
face (avoidable) fixed operating costs of FI for the incumbent and FE for the entrant.  
Firms maximize profits, and consumers maximize consumption benefits net of prices.  A 
firm cannot price discriminate among consumers.  For now, we treat the product 
characteristics of the incumbent and entrant good as exogenous.   7
There are  h l N N N + =  consumers, where  () h l N N = λ  is the relative number of 
type-l consumers.  Each consumer buys one or zero units of the good.  Let  0 h V ≥ and 
0 l V ≥ denote the benefits of the incumbent good for type-h and type-l consumers.  
Likewise, 0  and 0 hl WW ≥≥  denote consumer benefits of the entrant good.  We identify 
type-h consumers by the requirement that they more highly value the incumbent good.  
That is, Vh > Vl .  In this sense, we shall often refer to the two consumer groups as high-
value and low-value customers with the understanding that the same ordering need not 
apply to the entrant good. 
Parameters V and W represent locations in product space.  Higher values of Wl, 
for example, are naturally thought of as design improvements that enhance the value of 
the entrant good for type-l consumers.  However, changes in V and W also reflect any 
other technological or market development that alters the value of a good to one or both 
consumer types.  As an example, let Microsoft Windows be the incumbent product, and 
consider a rival product (e.g., Linux) that initially offers less consumer value, because it 
is harder to learn how to use or less compatible with complementary products. Now 
suppose that new software, available at cost c, provides a perfect Windows emulator 
when layered on top of the rival product.  If initially Vh – Wh > c and  Vl – Wl > c, the 
new "design" characteristics of the entrant good become  c V W h h − =  and  c V W l l − = . 
 
The Pre-Entry Monopoly Outcome 
 
As a useful preliminary, consider the pre-entry monopoly outcome.  Provided that 
he covers fixed costs, the incumbent monopolist prices at  h
M
I V P =  and earns 
I h h
M
I F N V − = π  when  () λ + > 1 l h V V .   He prices at Vl and earns  I l F N V −  when 
() λ + ≤ 1 l h V V .  Consumer surplus is 0 when the monopolist sells only to high-value 
customers, and it equals () h l h N V V −  when he sells to both types. 
The monopoly equilibrium with sales to high-value customers only is a useful 
analytical benchmark when entry expands market size but does not displace the 
incumbent.  In this case, entry may reduce the incumbent price, PI, without causing 
defections of type-h buyers to the entrant.  Consumer surplus then rises.  The monopoly   8
equilibrium with sales to both types is a useful benchmark when the entrant captures a 
portion of the incumbent's customer base but does not expand market size. Entry 
segments the market in this case, and type-h consumers may pay higher prices post-entry. 
Clearly, in a model with more consumer heterogeneity, an entrant might expand market 
size and capture part of the incumbent's customer base at the same time. In the two-type 
model that is our main focus, it is easy to isolate the market expansion and market 




Individual rationality requires that consumers and firms satisfy their respective 
participation conditions.  For consumers, participation by h requires  I h P V ≥ or  E h P W ≥ . 
Analogous conditions hold for type-l consumers. A firm participates if it covers fixed 
operating costs in equilibrium.  We assume that each firm could feasibly sell to either 







<<< < . 
This model does not have a pure-strategy Nash (Bertrand) equilibrium in prices.
3   
However, the model delivers equilibrium prices under a natural extension of the Bertrand 
equilibrium concept.   
 
Definition 1 (Price Cut Immunity): 
 
A pricing outcome { , } IE P P
∗∗ is price cut immune (PCI) if: 
(a) For any  II P P
∗ < ,   ( , ) ( , ) IIE II E P PP P ππ
∗∗ ∗ ≤ , and 
(b) for any  EE P P
∗ < ,   ( , ) ( , ) EI E EI E P PP P ππ
∗∗ ∗ ≤ , 
where (, ) IIE P P π denotes incumbent profit for own price  I P  and entrant price  E P , and 
analogously for  E π .  
 
Price cut immunity simply means that neither firm finds it profitable to increase its sales 
by cutting price, given the price charged by its rival.  This property holds for any 
Bertrand equilibrium.  For a price combination to be sustainable, we require that it be the 
most profitable of all PCI combinations.  That is:    9
 
Definition 2 (Sustainability): 
 
A pricing outcome {}
* *, E I P P  is sustainable if {}
* *, E I P P  is PCI and: 
(a) There is no  I P  such that { }
* , IE P P is PCI and  ( , ) ( , ) IIE II E P PP P ππ
∗∗ ∗ > . 
(b) There is no  E P  such that { } , IE P P
∗ is PCI and  ( , ) ( , ) EI E EI E P PP P ππ
∗∗ ∗ > . 
 
Finally, an equilibrium is a situation in which all participants are satisfied with their 
choices at sustainable prices: 
 
Definition 3 (Equilibrium): 
An equilibrium is a set of market participation outcomes for firms and consumers, 
product selections by participating consumers, and prices {} E I P P ,  such that: 
(a) Consumers and firms satisfy their participation conditions;  
(b) Each participating consumer buys one unit of the good that maximizes consumption 
benefits net of prices; 
(c)  {} E I P P ,  is sustainable. 
 
  Two remarks about this equilibrium concept are in order. First, in a standard 
model of Nash-Bertrand price competition between two firms with differentiated 
products, the Bertrand equilibrium is the unique sustainable outcome under our 
definitions.  That is, the Bertrand equilibrium is the most profitable of all outcomes that 
are immune from price cuts. This fact underlies the claim that our equilibrium concept is 
a natural extension of Bertrand equilibrium. Second, in qualitative terms, our propositions 
about pricing, exclusion and product design incentives also hold when the incumbent 
moves first in a version of the model with sequential price setting (Davis, Murphy and 
Topel, 2001a).  Simultaneous price setting is a more compelling assumption in most 
applications, but it is reassuring that the results also hold under sequential pricing. 
  
4   Post-Entry Pricing Equilibrium 
Consider the requirements for a post-entry sorting equilibrium in which the 
incumbent sells to type-h consumers, and the entrant sells to type-l consumers;.  That is, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 An appendix available from the authors establishes simple sufficient conditions for the non-existence of a 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in prices for a version of the model with a continuum of consumer types.  
Thus, non-existence does not hinge on the discrete distribution of consumer types.   10
focus on the case  l l h h W V W V − > − .  Both consumers and firms must be content with this 
sorting.  For consumers this requires that type-h buyers prefer to purchase from I: 
 
(1)                                             () h h E I W V P P − + ≤  
 
and that type-l buyers prefer E: 
 
(2)                                             () l l E I W V P P − + ≥ . 
 
On the sellers’ side of the market, the incumbent must prefer selling to type-h buyers at 
price PI to a price cut that is just sufficient to attract type-l buyers as well: 
 
                                             () [] ) ( l h l l E h I N N W V P N P + − + ≥ , 
 
or equivalently (using λ = Nl/Nh): 
 
(3)                                               () ( ) () λ λ + − + + ≥ 1 1 l l E I W V P P . 
 
Similarly, E prefers selling to type-l buyers at price PE to a price cut that would attract the 
type-h buyers as well, which implies: 
 








At positive prices conditions (3) and (4) imply (1) and (2).  So, if one exists, a separating 
equilibrium must lie in the region defined by (3) and (4), and it must satisfy the consumer 
participation conditions  Ih P V ≤  and  El P W ≤ .  Additional necessary conditions are spelled 
out below. 
Figure 1 illustrates the situation when consumer participation constraints are 
slack, showing the triangular region that satisfies (3) and (4).  By Definition 2, no price   11




I P P , , is sustainable.  At 
combination A each seller can raise price a small amount without losing customers and 
without provoking a price cut from its rival.  Formally, there is a 
A
I I P P >  such that 
{ } ,
A
IE P P  is price cut immune and  ( , ) ( , )
AA A
IIE II E P PP P ππ > .
4  This logic drives the 




I P P ,  that simultaneously satisfies 
conditions (3) and (4) as equalities. At these prices the incumbent is indifferent between 
selling to type-h buyers at price
S
I P  or cutting price to  ()
S
IE l l P PV W =+ − %  to serve type-l 
buyers as well.  Similarly, the entrant is indifferent between selling to type-l buyers at 
price 
S
E P  or cutting price to  ()
S
EI h h P PV W =− − %  to pick off the type-h buyers.  
Algebraically, the intersection of constraints (3) and (4) is given by: 
 
(5)                          () ( ) ( ) [] () h h l l h h
S











(6)                         () ( ) ( ) [] l l h h
S


















I P P , i s  a n  
equilibrium. For now, we presume that both firms earn nonnegative profits at S. 
First, consider whether  { } ,
SS
IE SP P =  is sustainable with respect to a price 
increase. Given 
S
E P , condition (1) implies that a small price increase by the incumbent 
raises his profits; type-h consumers will still buy from the incumbent at a slightly higher 
price.
5  So consider an incumbent price increase to 
S
I I P P > ˆ .  Since condition (4) now no 
longer holds, the entrant is not content to sell to type-l buyers only.  Instead, the entrant 
can capture the entire market by cutting price to a level slightly to the left of the boundary 
for condition (1), at point B in the Figure.  This price cut raises the entrant’s profits: 
 
                                                           
4 This same argument holds for one seller at any point on the boundary of the triangular region other than 
point S. 
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where the first line follows from condition (1) and the inequality from the fact that 
ˆ S
II P P > .  The last equality follows from the fact that at  { , }
SS
IE SP P = the entrant is 
indifferent between selling to type-l’s at 
S
E P and cutting price to  ( )
S
Ih h P VW −− to attract 
the type-h’s.  So any combination ˆ {,}
S
IE P P with ˆ S
II P P >  is not price cut immune.  By 
symmetry, any 
S
E E P P > ˆ  also violates PCI.  Hence,  { } ,
SS
IE SP P =  is sustainable with 
respect to a price increase by either firm. 
Now consider a price decrease.  Given 
S
E P , the incumbent cannot capture type-l 
consumers unless he cuts price below  I P
~
 in Figure 1.  So the incumbent earns lower 
profits for any price between
S
I P  and  I P
~
, because he captures no additional customers. He 
earns lower profits for prices below  I P
~
, because the lower price more than offsets the Nl 
customers that he gains.  The same logic applies to price cuts by the entrant.  Thus 
{ } ,
SS
IE SP P =  is sustainable with respect to price cuts by either firm. 
This argument means that a separating equilibrium is sustainable so long as both 
firms earn non-negative profits.  We gather these results in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1 (Separating Equilibrium): 
Let  { } ,
SS
IE SP P = be defined by (5) and (6). Assume that   and 
SS
hI lE VP WP ≥≥ , so that 














> , then S is the 
unique sustainable equilibrium.  The equilibrium is separating in that (i) firm I prefers to 
sell to type-h buyers at price 
S
I P , (ii) type-h buyers prefer to purchase from firm I at 
S
I P , 
(iii) firm E prefers to sell to type-l buyers at price 
S
E P , and (iv) type-l buyers prefer to 
purchase from firm E at 
S
E P .  
   13
 
For the case of two consumer types analyzed here, Proposition 1 does more than 
simply describe the separating equilibrium; it says that the separating equilibrium is the 
only sustainable outcome if it allows both firms to earn positive profits.  Thus, it does not 
pay for one seller to cut price with the intention of excluding a rival, if that rival could 
earn positive profits in a separating equilibrium. We show below that this feature of the 
separating equilibrium does not extend to situations with more than two consumer types – 
exclusion may then be worthwhile when both sellers earn profits at separating prices. 
Proposition 1 assumes slack participation constraints for consumers, and we focus 
on this interior case in the analysis below. However, it is straightforward to construct the 
separating prices when one or both consumer participations condition bind. For example, 
suppose that the participation condition for type-l consumers constrains the entrant’s 
separating price to 
SC
El P W = . In terms of Figure 1,  l W  lies to the left of
S
E P .  The same 
line of argument as before shows that the incumbent’s separating price in this case is the 
highest value of  I P  that satisfies (4). That is,  [] /(1 )
SC
Il h h P WV W λλ =+ + − . Similarly, 
when the participation condition binds for type-h consumers only, the separating prices 
are 
SC
Ih P V =  and  [ /(1 )]
SC
Eh l l P VW V λ =+ + − .      
Using (5) and (6), the unique separating equilibrium also has some interesting 
comparative statics, which we summarize in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2 (Comparative Statics for the Separating Equilibrium): 
Let  { } ,
SS
IE SP P = be defined by (5) and (6).  Then: 
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  The results in Proposition 2 are instructive of the nature of competition between 
the two firms in a separating equilibrium, and they are important to our later discussion of 
product design incentives.  For example, Equation (7) indicates that a  h dV  = $1 increase 
in the value of the incumbent’s good to type-h users – to whom the incumbent sells – 
raises the price of the incumbent’s good by more than $1.  This follows from the fact that 
in equilibrium  /(1 )
SS
Ih h E PV WP λλ =−+ +, so an increase in  h V has a direct effect on the 
incumbent’s price, as well as an indirect effect through the upward adjustment of the 
entrant’s price.  A higher price of the incumbent’s good makes it less attractive to type-l 
users, so the entrant can raise price – equation (10) – without risk of losing customers.  In 
contrast, equation (8) indicates that a  l dV =$1 increase in the value of the incumbent’s 
good to type-l users – to whom he does not sell in equilibrium – reduces the incumbent’s 
price by less than $1.  This price reduction occurs because an increase in the value of the 
incumbent’s good to the entrant’s buyers forces the entrant to reduce price to retain them, 
which in turn forces the incumbent to cut price to retain the type-h users. Combining (7) 
and (8), a $1 uniform-across-groups increase in the value of the incumbent’s good 
( hl dV dV == $1) increases the incumbent’s price, but by less than $1.   Other results in 
Proposition 2 follow the same logic. 
 
Exclusionary Pricing 
In some cases it pays for one firm to cut price in order to capture its rival’s 
customers.  Consistent with Proposition 1, this outcome occurs when the excluded rival 
would earn negative profits in the separating equilibrium, but stands ready to sell at a 
higher price that would cover fixed costs.  We show that the excluding firm earns positive 
profits, and that these profits are strictly higher than what it would earn in the separating 
equilibrium.  For some configurations of the parameters the identity of the excluding firm 
is unique, but a non-trivial portion of the parameter space yields multiple equilibria in 
which either the incumbent or the entrant could exclude. 
    What does it mean to “exclude” the entrant?  In our analysis, the entrant’s good 
represents an existing technology, valued by buyers at Wh and Wl, that is used in 
equilibrium if the entrant can cover fixed costs, FE.  For example, in the market for Intel-  15
compatible PC operating systems, original equipment manufacturers (OEM’s) such as 
Compaq, Dell, and Gateway can pre-install an existing, non-Windows operating system 
such as Linux on some or all of their machines.
6  For Microsoft to preclude this 
possibility, the price of Windows must be low enough to make this option unattractive to 
OEMs.
7  Similarly, a large hub-and-spoke airline that serves business (h) and vacation (l) 
travelers may accommodate entry by a rival that specializes in low fares and less service, 
thereby conceding the type-l’s, or it may price low enough to make operation by an 
existing low cost carrier unattractive. 
Without loss of generality, consider the incumbent’s decision of whether to 
exclude the entrant (the analysis for the entrant is symmetric).  To exclude the entrant, the 
incumbent must set PI so that the entrant cannot make positive profits at any price.  By 
condition (1), for a given PI  the entrant can capture the type-l customers by setting 
l l I E V W P P − + = .  This generates entrant profits of  () [] E l l l I F N V W P − − + .  So, to 
exclude the entrant from profitably selling to type-l customers (only), the incumbent must 
set PI no greater than () l l l E W V N F − + .  To exclude the entrant from profitably selling 
to both types, the incumbent must set PI no greater than () h h E W V N F − + .  The 
incumbent’s exclusionary price is then the minimum of these two values. 
This line of argument establishes the exclusionary prices 
x
I P  and
x
E P  for the 
incumbent and entrant.  Adopting the notation  / EE l f FN ≡ and / II h f FN ≡ for average 
fixed costs, we have: 
  




IE l l E h h P fV W f V W
λ
λ
+  =+ − + − 

, 
(12)                     
1
min ( ), ( )
1
x
EI h h Il l Pf V W f V W
λ




                                                           
6 A February 2001 phone call to the customer service center at Dell Computer Corporation confirms that 
Dell offers pre-installed Linux operating systems on both desktop and laptop personal computers. 
According to Dell’s web site, it is the largest seller of personal computers in the United States.   
7 Hall (2001) considers a model in which an upstream seller (Microsoft) may price low in order to preclude 




















.    When is it profitable for the incumbent to 
exclude rather than to accommodate entry?  The incumbent prefers exclusion if selling to 
both type-h and type-l users at 
x
I P is more profitable than selling to type-h users only in a 




I P P ≥ + λ 1 .  Likewise the entrant prefers 




E P P ≥ + λ 1 1.    
The set of exclusionary prices is illustrated in Figure 2.  Consider the 
incumbent’s strategy.  For any value of the entrant’s average cost  E f , measured along the 
horizontal, equation (11) defines the set of possible exclusionary prices by the incumbent.  
These are shown as the kinked boundary (acd) in the figure.  Suppose the entrant would 
earn positive profits in a separating equilibrium, as when average fixed costs are  ˆ S
EE f P < .  
Then the incumbent’s price that would exclude the entrant is  ˆ x
I P , for which 
ˆ (1 )
xS
II P P λ +<.  That is, the incumbent prefers the separating equilibrium to exclusionary 
pricing when the entrant would earn positive profits in the separating equilibrium.  When 
average fixed costs are higher, such as 
S
EE f P > % , the exclusionary price satisfies 
(1 )
xS
II P P λ +> % , so the incumbent’s profits are higher than in the separating equilibrium.  
This analysis implies that the incumbent’s exclusionary price is an increasing function of 
the entrant’s average fixed cost over the range where 
S
EE f P > , shown as the bold 
boundary (bcd) in the figure.  By analogous argument, the entrant’s exclusionary price 
increases with  I f  over the range where
S
II f P > , shown as the bold boundary (b’c’d’). 
The exclusionary prices shown in Figure 2 are only relevant when one or both 
firms earn negative profits in the separating equilibrium; otherwise Proposition 1 implies 
that the separating equilibrium is the unique sustainable outcome.  To lay out the 
possibilities for exclusion, suppose first that 
S
II f P ≤  -- the incumbent makes non-
negative profits in the separating equilibrium -- but the entrant’s average cost is 
S
EE f P > % .  
Then by the same argument as in the previous paragraph, the incumbent prefers to 
capture the market at price 
xS
II P P < % , as illustrated in Figure 2.  Further, this exclusionary 
equilibrium is sustainable: given 
x
I P % , there is no price at which the entrant can attract   17
customers and make non-negative profit.  So, if one firm would be profitable in the 
separating equilibrium and the other would not, the equilibrium outcome is for the 
profitable firm to exclude its rival at a price determined by (11) or (12). 
Proposition 3 (Exclusion by the Profitable Seller): 
(a) If 
S
II f P ≤ and 
S
EE f P >  the unique sustainable equilibrium is for the incumbent to 




II f P > and 
S
EE f P ≤  the unique sustainable equilibrium is for the entrant to exclude 
the incumbent at an exclusionary price given by (12).          
  Proposition 3 is a special case of a more general result on profitable exclusion, 
which covers the case where both sellers would lose money in the separating equilibrium.  
Denote by 
x
I π  and 
x
E π  the profits that the incumbent and entrant would earn by 
successfully excluding the other party.  By (11), the range of  I f  where 
x
I π >0 depends on 
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(13)                                  0 (1 ) ( )(1 )
x
IEl l I f vw f πλ λ ≥⇔ ++− +≥ 
 
Similarly, using (12) the set of  E f that yield 
x
E π >0 depends on  I f : 
(14)                                0
1
x







Constraints (13) and (14) have the same form as (3) and (4), with the replacement of 
prices by average costs.  Together with the region where both firms earn non-negative 
profits in the separating equilibrium –  0
S
I π ≥ and 0
S
E π ≥ -- they serve to divide the 
parameter space into four distinct regions, as shown in Figure 3. 
                                                           
8 If the exclusionary price in (11) exceeds Vl then the price will be set at Vl.  Similarly, if the exclusionary 
price in (12) exceeds Vh then the price will be set at Vh.  We ignore these boundaries in the text for ease of 
exposition.   18
Consider the lower right region of the figure, where (13) and (14) imply that 
x
I π >0, 
xS
II ππ > , 
x
E π <0, and 
S
E π <0.  For cost combinations in this region, the incumbent 
can earn positive profits by charging an exclusionary price given by (11), which depends 
on the entrant’s fixed cost and on buyers’ willingness to pay.  The incumbent’s profits are 
greater than in the separating equilibrium, so the incumbent prefers exclusion in this 
region.  The entrant earns negative profit, even at the price that would exclude the 
incumbent.  So, in this region, the unique sustainable equilibrium is for the incumbent to 
exclude the entrant.  Similar reasoning applies to the upper left region, where
x
E π >0, 
xS
EE ππ > , 
x
I π <0, and 
S
I π <0; there the unique sustainable equilibrium is for the entrant to 
exclude the incumbent at a price given by (12). 
This leaves the conical region in the center of Figure 3, where 
x
I π >0 and 
x
E π >0: in 
this region neither firm could cover costs when both participate, but both would earn 
positive profits at their respective exclusionary prices.  In other words there are two 
possible equilibria – one where the incumbent excludes the entrant and the other where 
the entrant excludes the incumbent – and nothing in the model’s structure allows us to 
choose between them.
9 This region is analogous to the situation in which two identical 
Bertrand competitors could sell in a particular market.  Both lose money if both 
participate, but there is a contestable-market equilibrium in which one firm operates at a 
price equal to the excluded firm’s average cost.  With identical costs, there are two 
possible equilibria and the identity of the excluded firm is undetermined.  There are two 
important differences between this situation and ours, however.  First, with the 
demand/cost structure of our model multiple exclusionary equilibria are possible in a 
“large” part of the parameter space, as shown in Figure 3.  Second, as we show below, 
which firm excludes in this region can have important welfare implications – unlike the 
standard contestable markets model, from an efficiency perspective it is not a matter of 
indifference which firm operates and which firm is excluded. 
                                                           
9 Provided that both consumer participation constraints are slack at prices, { } ,
SS
IE P P . As an inspection of 
Figure 3 readily shows, the equilibrium cannot lie in the conical region when either consumer participation 
condition binds.    19
Proposition 4 (Exclusion): 
If a separating equilibrium generates negative profits for at least one firm, then the 
equilibrium is exclusionary.  The possibilities are: 
(a) 0, 0, 0,
Sxx x S
EEII I πππ π π <<≥> : The unique equilibrium is for incumbent to exclude 
entrant at a price given by (11). 
(b) 0, 0, 0,
Sxx x S
IIE E E πππ π π <<≥> : The unique equilibrium is for entrant to exclude 
incumbent at a price given by (12). 
(c) 0 , 0
xS xS
EE I I ππ ππ ≥> ≥> :  There are two sustainable equilibria: either incumbent 
excludes entrant at price (11) or entrant excludes incumbent at price (12). 
 
  The result that exclusion only occurs when one or both firms earn negative profits 
at the separating prices is an artifact of our restriction to two consumer types.  With more 
types, exclusion takes place in a richer set of circumstances.  Consider a separating 
outcome with three types, h, l and k.  Assume that  hh llkk VWVWVW −> −> −, and that 
both I and E can earn positive profits when I sells to type-h users and E sells to type-l, 
while type-k do not buy at the separating prices.  Then an exclusionary price cut by I that 
is large enough to attract both type-l and type-k users can raise I’s profits while 
expanding the market to include type-k’s.  Exclusion can also cause the market to 
contract.  For example, with the same three types suppose E earns more (and positive) 
profit by selling to both type-l and type-k at separating prices.  Then a price cut by I that 
attracts only the type-l users may drive E out because there are too few type-k’s to cover 
fixed cost at any feasible price.  
 
5   Market Structure and Efficiency  
Proposition 4 indicates that three market structures are possible: exclusion by the 
incumbent, exclusion by the entrant, or separation.  In each, social surplus equals the 
value received by users less the fixed cost of operation.  Denoting surplus in each case by 
,
xx
IE SS , and 
S S , we have: 
   20
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Efficient outcomes are the maximum of (15a-c).  Some algebra establishes: 
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For given valuations, these conditions determine regions in (, ) IE f f -space 
wherein each market structure is the efficient outcome, as shown in Figure 4.  We have 
drawn the figure under the assumption that   and  hh l l VW WV >> , so that separation is 
efficient for some positive values of  I f  and  E f . 
Comparison to Figure 3 indicates that combinations(, ) IE f f for which separation 
is efficient form a proper subset of the region where separation actually occurs. At a point 
like α (β) the equilibrium outcome is separation because both I and E earn positive 
profits, while the efficient outcome is for I (E) to be the sole supplier at an exclusionary 
price.  More precisely, point β illustrates a case of inefficient entry by E:  entry is 
profitable because 
S
EE f P < , but entry is inefficient because fixed costs are not offset by 
additional value:  El l f WV >− .   This distortion of entry decisions is especially evident in 
the case where  ll VW > .  Then a separating equilibrium is never efficient – type-l 
consumers end up with a less valuable good – even though entry is profitable. 
For other combinations of(, ) IE f f , the “wrong” seller may exclude – at point γ the 
equilibrium outcome is for the entrant to exclude the incumbent, but the efficient market 
structure is for the incumbent to exclude.  Lastly, at points like δ the equilibrium is not 
unique, although the boundary 
xx
IE SS =  indicates that exclusion by one party or the other 
is efficient.   21
These inefficient participation decisions occur because the efficient supplier 
cannot extract enough surplus at the single exclusionary price to make exclusion 
worthwhile.  For example, at point β the incumbent earns greater profits in a separating 
equilibrium ( (1 )
xS
II P P λ +<), so he concedes type-l users to the rival.  Of course if the 
incumbent could price discriminate, cutting price to 
x
I P for only the type-l buyers, then he 
could earn higher profits by excluding than by accommodating entry.  Then the efficient 
exclusionary outcome would also be the equilibrium.  More generally, if (15a) exceeds 
(15b) – so the incumbent is the efficient seller – then for any pair of discriminatory prices 
by the entrant that yield non-negative entrant profits, there are discriminatory prices by 
the incumbent such that (a) all buyers prefer the incumbent’s product and (b) the 
incumbent earns positive profits.  Then the efficient seller supplies the market. 
    
Proposition 5 (Inefficient Entry and Participation): 
When sellers must charge a uniform price, entry and participation decisions are generally 
inefficient.   
In a separating equilibrium: 
(a) The equilibrium is efficient if  Ihh E l l f V W and f W V <− <− . 
(b) E inefficiently participates if  El l f WV >−  and () Ihh llE f VW VWf λ <−+ −+ . 
(c) I  inefficiently participates if  Ihh f VW >− and () Ihh llE f VW VWf λ >−+ −+ . 
In an exclusionary equilibrium: 
(a) E inefficiently excludes if 0
x
I π < and  () Ihh llE f VW VWf λ <−+ −+  
(b) I  inefficiently excludes if  0
x
E π < and  () Ihh llE f VW VWf λ >−+ −+  
 
In summary, there are two sources of deadweight loss in the event of inefficient 
entry: a wasteful duplication of fixed costs and a misallocation of goods to consumers. 
Entry can lead to either or both forms of deadweight loss.  
 
6   Post-Entry Product Design Incentives 
  To this point, we have treated the valuations  { } , hl VV V = and  { } , hl WW W = as 
exogenous.  Yet they are clearly subject to some control by sellers, who can strategically 
design products to affect V and W, and so affect market outcomes.  Typically we think of   22
design decisions by the incumbent as affecting  h V  or  l V , or both, while the entrant 
determines  h W  and  l W .   We focus on this case, but we also recognize that actions by one 
seller can affect valuations for a rival’s good. For example, sellers commonly disparage 
rival products in an effort to reduce their value in the eyes of consumers. The design 
characteristics of a seller’s complementary goods can also affect the value of a rival’s 
good.  Microsoft supports versions of Word and Excel that run under Apple’s operating 
system – raising the value of the Apple platform – but allegedly made its Windows 3.1 
software incompatible with rival operating systems such as DR DOS.  
   We focus on incentives to alter V or W and ignore the cost of design changes. As 
it turns out, design incentives hinge on whether a firm excludes its rival or shares the 
market, and on whether the firm uses the design change to exclude or to soften price 
competition.  For example, from (11) we know that  / 0
x
Il PV ∂∂ > , so that a “design 
enhancement” that makes the incumbent’s good more attractive to his rival’s potential 
customers raises the price that an excluding incumbent can charge.  Yet Proposition 2 
established that  / 0
S
Il PV ∂∂ < :Once successful entry has occurred, a larger value of  l V  
induces the entrant to reduce price to retain his customers, which forces the incumbent to 
price lower to retain his as well.  Thus  l V ∆ >0 raises the exclusionary profits of an 
incumbent and reduces the range of costs over which entry is profitable ( / 0
S
El PV ∂∂ < ), 
but it reduces the incumbent’s profits in the event of successful entry.  
Product Design in a Separating Equilibrium 
  In a separating equilibrium, Proposition 2 states that firm I prefers design changes 
that increase value to type-h consumers ( / 1
S
Ih PV ∂∂ > ) but that do not attract its rival’s 
customers ( / 0
S
Il PV ∂∂ < ).  Thus, an “ideal” design change for I is targeted at type-h 
users: 0,  0 hl VV ∆>∆≤ .  Similarly an ideal design change for E is targeted at type-l’s: 
0, 0 lh WW ∆>∆≤ .     23
  Ideal changes of this sort may be difficult to implement, so think of a design 
improvement that is worth  0 h V ∆> to I’s targeted type-h users, and worth  lh VV θ ∆= ∆to 
type-l’s.  Here  1 θ ≤  measures the degree of “spillover” to the non-targeted customer 
group.  Some algebra establishes  

































When /( ) hhl N NN θ <+  a targeted design change increases I’s price by more than the 
value of the improvement to type-h users ( / 1
S
Ih PV ∆∆ > ) and raises E’s price as well 
(/ 0
S
Eh PV ∆∆ > ).  Hence, both consumer types are worse off because of the design 
change.  Further, because the change in I’s price is greater than the value of the design 
improvement, there is a clear incentive for excessive product differentiation. 
Proposition 6 (Targeted Design Changes in a Separating Equilibrium): 
Consider a targeted design change by firm I {0 h V ∆> , lh VV θ ∆= ∆}, with  1 θ ≤ .  The 
effects on prices and consumer welfare depend on the amount of spillover, θ .  If 
/( ) hhl N NN θ <+  then: 
1.   / 1
S
Ih PV ∆∆ > and / 0
S
Eh PV ∆∆ > : Prices charged by both sellers rise, and the 
price to type-h users rises by more than their value of the design improvement. 
2.  Consumer surplus falls for all users. 
3.  Incentives support excess product differentiation.       
Design flexibility leads to excess product differentiation in the separating equilibrium, 
because firms use it as a tool to soften price competition. The effect is to transfer surplus 
from consumers to producers and to distort the path of innovation relative to the criterion 
of consumer or total surplus.    24
In some settings, design flexibility may be sharply circumscribed by technological 
or other considerations that dictate the “direction” of product design changes. The 
following proposition deals with this case. 
 
Proposition 7 (Innovation Along a Fixed Path in a Separating Equilibrium): Assume 
that incremental product improvements occur along fixed innovation paths defined by the 
ratios  l h W W ∆ ∆  for the entrant and  h l V V ∆ ∆  for the incumbent. 
A.  (Innovation Incentives) Own product improvements are profitable for the entrant if 
λ + < ∆ ∆ 1 l h W W  and for the incumbent if  () λ λ / 1+ < ∆ ∆ h l V V   
B.  (Consumer Surplus) Innovation by the entrant raises consumer surplus if  
()




























Proof: Part A follows directly from equations (5) and (6). To prove the first part of B, 
use (5) to show that the impact on surplus for type-h consumers is proportional to 
() () l h W W ∆ + − ∆ + + λ λ λ λ 1 2 1
2 .  Use (6) to show that the impact on surplus for type-l 
consumers is proportional to () l h W W ∆ − ∆ + λ λ 1  for the same factor of proportionality. 
Since  l h N N = λ , the impact on overall consumer surplus is proportional to 
() () l h W W ∆ + − ∆ + + λ λ λ λ 2 1 2 3 1
2 , which yields the result. Similar calculations yield the 
second  part  of  B.              
 
A simple example draws out the implications of Proposition 7. When 1 = λ , 
incremental innovation by the entrant is profitable for  / 2 hl WW ∆∆ < , and it raises 
consumer surplus for  /3 5 hl WW ∆∆ >. Hence, in this example, the entrant would forego 
a no-cost product improvement that raises consumer and total surplus, if  / 2. hl WW ∆∆ >  
Similarly, the incumbent's innovation incentives in this example are adverse to consumer 
interests for  ( ] /0 , . 7 5 lh VV ∆∆ ∈ , and they are adverse to total surplus for  / 2 lh VV ∆∆ > .   25
Thus, even when technology constrains the product design path, a firm's innovation 
incentives can easily run counter to the interests of consumer welfare or total surplus in a 
separating equilibrium. Firms will forego no-cost design improvements, if they intensify 
price competition too much.   
Exclusion by Product Design 
When both firms earn profits at the separating outcome, neither firm adopts an 
exclusionary price in the model with only two consumer types. Yet, even in this case, 
exclusionary strategies based on product design changes can be profitable, as we now 
show.  By definition, a successful exclusionary strategy must (a) raise the excluding 
firm’s profits, so that exclusion is preferred, and (b) preclude the rival from earning 
profits.  If we treat firm I as the excluding seller, these conditions require  
ˆ ˆ (( 1 ) )0
ˆ ˆ () 0
xS x S







∆=− = +− >
=− <
 
where a ‘∧’ over a variable indicates its post-design-change value.  We consider design 
changes that satisfy these conditions. We assume that the entrant can avoid its fixed costs 
by withdrawing from the market in response to the incumbent’s design change. 
  By Proposition 2, there are 4 possible ways to reduce E’s price and drive him 
from the market:  0, 0, 0, and 0. ll h h VWV W ∆>∆ <∆< ∆ > Of these, we can rule out 
strategies based on  0 h V ∆<  and  0 h W ∆>  because they do not increase the exclusionary 
price that I can charge after driving E out, so  0 I π ∆< .  For example, suppose that I 
degrades his product, reducing  h V  by enough to drive E out.  Since  0 h V ∆<  does not 
raise the exclusionary price, and (1 )
xS
II P P λ +< , 0 h V ∆< cannot be profitable.  
The strategies that can both reduce 
S
E P  and raise
x
I P are 0 l V ∆>  and  0 l W ∆< .  
0 l V ∆>  is an “own product” competitive design improvement that is targeted at E’s   26
customer base.  In contrast,  0 l W ∆< is a form of strategic “sabotage” in which I degrades 
the value of E’s product to type-l users.   
Suppose I attacks E’s customer base with  ˆ 0 ll l VVV ∆=−> .  The change in I’s 
profit from successful exclusion is  
ˆ [( )(1 ) ]
ˆ [( ) ]
S
Ih E l l I
S
EE l l
N fV W P
NP f V V
πλ ∆= +− +−




EE P f −  is E’s profit per customer in the separating equilibrium.  In driving E 
out, I must transfer this surplus to all buyers.  The second term,  ˆ
ll VV − , is the increase in 
the exclusionary price that I can charge once E is driven out.  Hence, the change in I’s 
profit is positive only for sufficiently large values of  ˆ
ll VV − .   
In particular, let  ˆ
ll VV − ˆ () () ll ll VV VV ≡−+−, where  ll VV −  is the minimum 
necessary improvement that drives E’s profits to zero.  Then 
(18)                    
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A successful exclusionary design change has two effects on profits.  The first term in (18) 
is the change in profit from a design change that is just sufficient to exclude ( ˆ
ll VV = ).  









.  Intuitively, exclusion by product design drives 
down the separating prices of both sellers, so a design change that is just sufficient to 
exclude E cannot be profitable.
10  The second term is I’s gain from a higher exclusionary 
                                                           
10 Recall that in the separating equilibrium each seller is indifferent between charging its separating price 
and cutting price to the level that would exclude:  (1 )
xS
II P P λ +=.  So when  ˆ
ll VV = , the incumbent is 
indifferent between exclusion and separation.   27
price to all buyers once E is driven out.  This component must be large enough to offset 
the “cost” of exclusion, as represented by the first term. 
  Analysis of exclusion by “sabotage” ( 0 l W ∆< ) is similar.  The change in I’s 
profits from successful exclusion is  
(19)                   
ˆ [( ) ]
ˆ () ()
S
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where  0 ll WW −<  is the minimum amount of sabotage necessary to eliminate E’s profits.  









.  This cost must be offset by the 
term  () 0 ll NW W −> , representing revenues from the higher exclusionary price that I can 
charge after E is driven out.  Again, the total amount of sabotage must be large enough to 
offset the cost of exclusion. 
  The effects of successful exclusion on consumer welfare depend on whether the 
strategy pursued by I is an own-product design improvement ( 0 l V ∆> ) or sabotage 
(0 l W ∆< ).  If the former, consider a targeted design innovation  ˆ
ll l VVV ∆=− and its 
associated spillover  ˆ
hhh VVV ∆=−.  The change in surplus for type-l users is: 
(20)                        
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So type-l users – who purchased from E prior to exclusion – must gain from a product 
innovation that excludes E from the market.  In effect, the per-unit profits that were 
earned by E are transferred to type-l users, who now purchase the “improved” version of 
I’s good. For type-h users:   28
(21)                            
ˆ ˆˆ ()











hhI El l E h h
S




























Type-h consumers also benefit from an innovation that excludes E.  Thus, own-product 
design changes that lead to successful exclusion are welfare improving for both 
consumer types. 
  In contrast, successful sabotage reduces the welfare of type-l users, but it may be 
welfare improving for type-h.  The former effect occurs because  0 l W ∆< raises the 
exclusionary price that type-l’s must pay, without raising the value of the good that they 
consume in the exclusionary equilibrium.  Formally, 
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so I’s gain in profit is a loss to type-l users.  For type-h users the change in welfare is 
determined by whether price rises or falls with exclusion: 
(23)                        
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ [( 1 ) ]
ˆ
Sx S x x










−= −= − + +
∆
=− +  
The first term is non-positive, as I must prefer exclusion.  But profitable sabotage still 
leaves room for type-h’s to gain because the exclusionary price is likely to be lower than 
.
S
I P  Design sabotage that is just worthwhile for the incumbent ( 0 I π ∆= ) always   29
improves welfare for type-h users because exclusion leads to a lower price.  Unlike the 
case of own-product design changes ( 0 l V ∆> ), when exclusion is achieved by 
competitive sabotage ( 0 l W ∆< ) the interests of consumer groups are not aligned.  
Proposition 8 (Exclusion by Product Design): 
Beginning from a separating equilibrium, seller I may profitably exclude its rival by 
either own product design improvements that are targeted at E’s customer base ( 0 l V ∆> ), 
or by design sabotage that reduces the value of E’s good ( 0 l W ∆< ).  When these design 
changes are large enough to yield profitable exclusion: 
1.  Own product design changes  0 l V ∆>  increase consumer welfare for both type-
l and type-h users. 
2.  Competitive sabotage  0 l W ∆< reduces welfare for type-l users, but will raise 
welfare for type-h users if price falls with exclusion ( ˆ xS
II P P < ).    
 
7   Price Effects of Entry 
 
In a standard industry model where competing firms sell perfect substitutes, entry 
of a new seller reduces the price charged by all sellers and raises overall welfare.  For 
example, if the market was initially monopolized, the entry of a new non-cooperative 
seller would yield a lower price and greater industry output.  These clean predictions 
need not hold when competing sellers produce differentiated products for diverse buyers, 
however.  In our model, the incumbent firm may react to entry by raising price, and both 
consumer and total surplus may fall.  
We now reserve the term “entry” for situations where a new seller makes positive 
sales in the market under study.  This happens when 
S
EE P f ≥  in a separating equilibrium, 
or when the entrant displaces the incumbent by charging an exclusionary price.  Entry 
can occur for three reasons: 
1.  A new rival emerges with { , , } Ehl f WW.  The rival can affect the incumbent’s 
price either because the incumbent chooses to exclude or because entry is 
profitable:
S
EE P f ≥ .   30
2.  The costs of participating for an existing product,  E f , decline by enough to 
make entry worthwhile for given valuations V and W. 
3.  Valuations V and W  change in such a way that entry becomes worthwhile for a 
given cost of participating. 
We treat these cases in turn. 
Emergence of a New Product     
  Consider a new product that, absent competition, could survive by selling to type-
l users;  El f W < .  For brevity, focus on the case where  hl VV >  and  hl h l VVWW −> −. 
According to Figure 3, there are at least three possible outcomes: (i) the incumbent 
excludes the new product at a price given by (11); (ii) both firms participate at prices 
{,}
SS
IE P P ; (iii) the entrant excludes at a price given by (12).
11  The last outcome has 
implications for efficiency, which we take up below, but not for the incumbent’s price. 
  If the incumbent prices to exclude, then (11) implies that 
x
IE l l l P fV W V ≤+ −< .  
If (1 ) hl VV λ >+  then the incumbent monopolist had previously sold to type-h users only 
at price  h V . In this case, the new product causes price to fall while expanding unit sales of 
the incumbent’s good.  If  (1 ) hl VV λ <+ then the incumbent monopolist’s price had been 
l V , so that price falls without affecting unit sales.  In either case, the new product causes 
a fall in the incumbent’s price. When  El f W > , the entrant could survive by selling to both 
types if  /(1 ) El f W λλ +<.  The incumbent’s exclusionary price is then 
/(1 )
x
IE h h l P fV W V λλ =+ + − < , so price must fall in this case as well. Finally, by a 
similar analysis, one can also show that price falls when the entrant can only survive by 
selling to type-h users. In summary, when the emergence of a new product elicits an 
exclusionary pricing response, price must fall below the monopoly level. 
  If the new product is profitable in a separating equilibrium, entry occurs.  If the 
incumbent was originally pricing at  h V , then we know that the incumbent’s price cannot 
rise, and it must fall if consumer participation constraints are slack at the post-entry 
                                                           
11 Two other outcomes are also possible. First, entry can be ineffectual in the sense that the incumbent 
excludes the entrant while continuing to price at the monopoly level. Second, both firms participate, but 
one or both consumer participation conditions bind. The first possibility is trivial, and the second possibility 
has similar implications to the interior separating case considered in the text.   31
outcome because 
S
Ih P V < .  If monopoly demand was elastic, however, the incumbent 
originally sold to both types at price  l V .  In this case, the separating equilibrium involves 
incumbent sales to type-h only, possibly at a higher price 
S
Il P V > .  In effect, the 
incumbent “retreats” up market, selling only to consumers with high willingness to pay 
for his product. 
 
Proposition 9 (Incumbent’s Price with Successful Entry of a New Product): 
Successful entry by the seller of a new product causes an incumbent monopolist to reduce 
price if
M
Ih P V = .  Entry may cause the incumbent to raise price if 
M
Il P V = .   
 
Some numerical examples illustrate the range of possible pricing responses to the 
introduction of a rival product. Suppose that  9,  5,  3 hl h VVW == =  and 
1 hl IE NNFF ==== , so that the incumbent prices at 5 and sells to both types prior to 
entry. When  1 l W < , the new product has no effect, because it is not attractive enough to 
influence the equilibrium. For  (1,2.75), l W ∈  entry induces an exclusionary pricing 
response by the incumbent. The new product then has no effect on allocations, but it 
benefits consumers by depressing the incumbent’s price.
12 When  2.75, l W >  exclusionary 
pricing by the incumbent is too costly in terms of foregone revenues. So, the incumbent 
retreats up market, allowing the entrant to capture the type-l consumers. In this example, 
the incumbent raises price above the exclusionary level and above the pre-entry 
monopoly level. In contrast, if  6, h W = then the new product leads to a separating 
outcome with an incumbent price below the monopoly price for all  (4.25,6.5). l W ∈  
A good real-world example of Proposition 9 occurs when the patent expires on a 
“brand name” prescription drug.  A generic manufacturer may then market a chemical 
copy of the patented drug.  Although the generic and branded drugs have identical active 
ingredients, the branded version typically sells for a large premium. These facts are 
implied by our model when  ( )(1 ) hh ll VW VW λ −>− + , so that a separating equilibrium is 
                                                           
12 One can modify the example to include a third consumer type that places low value on the incumbent’s 
good and does not buy in the monopoly outcome. For suitable parameters, the entrant sells to the third type,   32
feasible.  As we discussed in the introduction, the evidence on the direction of post-entry 
price changes for brand name drugs is mixed – sometimes they rise, sometimes they fall. 
This evidence is consistent with Proposition 9. 
 
Entry of an Existing Technology 
Proposition 9 indicates that an incumbent may raise price in the face of successful 
entry by a new product.  This outcome is more likely when the entrant produces an 
existing technology that was previously excluded by the incumbent.  To achieve entry of 
a previously excluded product, either the costs of participating must fall or product design 
parameters must change so that participation by the entrant becomes profitable. 
Consider the case where the entrant’s fixed cost of participation,  E f , declines, 
leaving valuations unchanged.  Recall that the incumbent’s exclusionary price is  




IE l l E h h P fV W f V W
λ
λ
+  =+ − + − 

, 
which is shown in Figure 5.  If fixed costs are so high that 
x
I P is given by the second term 
in brackets, then inspection of Figure 5 shows that 
Sx
II P P < , and the incumbent’s price 
falls upon entry.  But, if the exclusion margin initially involves the type-l’s only, so that 
x
IE l l P fV W =+ −, then the incumbent’s price can rise or fall with entry.  Some algebra 
establishes the critical level  (1 ) ( )
S
EE l l f PV W λλ
∗ =+ + − , shown in Figure 5, that 
determines whether 
Sx
II P P > .  All values of  EE f f
∗ <  imply 
Sx
II P P > , so that the 
incumbent’s price rises in the face of successful entry caused by a decline in entrant fixed 
costs.  Inspecting the figure establishes that the incumbent’s price rises with entry when 
the pre-entry level of  E f  is not “too large”. 
 
Proposition 10 (Entry due to a Decline in the Rival’s Fixed Costs): 
When the incumbent seller prices to exclude the entrant, a sufficiently large decline in  E f  
may lead to entry and a separating equilibrium.  The incumbent’s price rises (falls) upon 
entry if the original level of  E f  is smaller (larger) than  (1 ) ( )
S
EE l l f PV W λλ
∗ =+ + − . 
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
while eliciting an incumbent price that excludes sales of the new product to type-h and type-l consumers.  
Thus, exclusionary pricing need not involve 100 percent market share for the leading firm.    33
Another, perhaps more interesting, scenario involves design changes that make 
entry profitable.  For example, an excluded entrant can alter  h W or  l W  and thereby affect 
its post-entry price.  Since  / 0
S
El PW ∂∂ >  and  / 0
S
Eh PW ∂∂ < , an “ideal” design 
improvement from the entrant’s perspective is one that targets consumers who will buy 
his product in equilibrium ( 0 l W ∆> ), without raising the valuations of his rival’s 
customers ( 0 h W ∆≤ ).  A design improvement of this type increases the separating prices 
of both firms, and the resulting entry must raise the incumbent’s price above the pre-entry 
exclusionary price.  This can be seen in Figure 5.  For any cost of participation such as 
ˆ S
EE f P > that blocks profitable entry, there is a  0 l W ∆>  that would make entry profitable.  
The resulting equilibrium values of 
S
I P must lie on constraint 
1






right of  ˆ
E f , which satisfy  ˆ Sx
II P P > .  Similarly for discrete changes  0 h V ∆> that raise 
both separating prices along the constraint ( )(1 ) ll E VW f λ −+ +, the incumbent’s post-
entry value of 
S
I P must exceed his pre-entry exclusionary price. 
  As we argued above, such “ideal” product design changes may not be feasible.  
So assume that the potential entrant implements a design improvement  0 l W ∆> with 
spillover 0 hl WW φ ∆= ∆> .  The entrant’s incentive to avoid direct competition for the 
incumbent’s base suggests  1 φ < , but this is not necessary.  Then the ratio of separating 


















This slope defines a vector starting from  { , }
SS
IE SP P = that gives the set of new separating 
prices that are consistent with attribute changes  0 l W ∆> and arbitrary φ , as shown in 
Figure 5.  The impact of entry on the incumbent’s price is determined by whether this 
line lies above or below the incumbent’s original exclusionary price function at the new, 
feasible value of 
S
E P .  The smaller is φ , the greater the range of feasible 
S
E P where the   34
incumbent’s price must rise with entry, and when φ =0 the incumbent’s price rises 
unambiguously. 
 
Proposition 11 (Entry due to Improved Product Attributes): 
An excluded seller may achieve entry by product improvements that yield 
S
EE P f > .  If 
changes in valuations apply only to type-l users ( 0 l W ∆> ,0 h W ∆= ), the incumbent’s 
price rises with entry.  If changes in valuations apply to both user types 
(0 l W ∆> ,0 h W ∆> ), then the incumbent’s price may rise or fall with entry. 
 
 
8   Multi-Product Monopoly 
To this point, our analysis considers the post-entry equilibrium relative to outcomes for a 
single-product monopolist. Another natural market structure to consider is a monopolist 
who occupies both locations in product space. The multi-product monopolist maximizes 
profit over prices, 
M
I P  and 
M
E P , subject to the consumer participation and product 
selection conditions. 
Figure 6 depicts the opportunity set for the multi-product monopolist. Given Vh - 
Wh > Vl - Wl, the consumer product selection conditions (1) and (2) define a nonempty 
region bounded by the solid parallel lines in the figure. Profitability requires positive 
prices. Recalling the definitional condition Vh > Vl, the participation condition for type-h 
consumers further restricts the opportunity set to points on or below the horizontal line at 
Vh. When Wl < Wh, the participation boundary for type-l consumers is a vertical line that 
intersects condition 1 at a point like A, so that the opportunity set is defined by a 
parallelogram. When lh WW ≥ , the participation boundary for type-l consumers is a 
vertical line that intersects the 
M
I P = Vh line at a point like B, so that the opportunity set is 
defined by a quadrilateral. Hence, a multi-product monopolist who segments the market 
maximizes profit by pricing at a point like A or B, as Wl is smaller or larger than Wh. 
Making use of Figure 6, we characterize multi-product monopoly outcomes and 
compare them to the duopoly market structure in an appendix. There are two main 
results. First, different market structures give rise to a misallocation of goods in different 
regions of the parameter space. For this reason, it is not possible to uniformly rank 
alternative market structures – monopoly versus two competing firms – by the criterion   35
of allocative efficiency or total surplus. For the same reason, but perhaps more 
surprisingly, the two market structures cannot be uniformly ranked by the criterion of 
consumer surplus. For some parameter values, the loss of consumer surplus engendered 
by an inefficient allocation in a two-firm separating equilibrium more than offsets the 
effect of monopoly pricing on consumer welfare. As a result, consumer surplus can be 
greater under monopoly than with two competing firms. 
Second, the adverse design incentives that arise under duopoly can also arise 
under multi-product monopoly. However, adverse incentives are weaker under multi-
product monopoly in two respects. One, the incentive for quality degradation arises in a 
smaller region of the parameter space. Two, even in that region, the monopolist benefits 
from quality degradation in only one, not two, directions. Multi-product monopoly also 
implies less scope for adverse design incentives when technology dictates the direction of 
innovation. Monopoly design incentives are better aligned with economic efficiency, 
because a single firm can more readily extract surplus (without resorting to inferior 
product designs) than two firms that price non-cooperatively.   
 
9   Concluding Remarks  
We have analyzed the effects of entry into an initially monopolized market on price, 
efficiency and consumer welfare. For given product design characteristics, entry can be 
beneficial by expanding the market or lowering prices. But successful entry can also 
cause the incumbent to raise price as he concedes part of the market, harming some 
consumers. When entry undermines an exclusionary pricing regime, it can raise price and 
lower surplus for all consumers. These adverse effects of entry do not arise with a 
homogeneous product but can easily happen with differentiated products.  In segmenting 
the market, successful entry can also induce an inefficient allocation of goods. Given the 
potential for higher prices and a misallocation of goods, successful entry does not ensure 
gains in consumer welfare or total surplus.  
Unsuccessful entry can be highly beneficial to consumers. Consumers benefit 
when the entrant, even though unsuccessful in the sense of market share, elicits an 
exclusionary pricing response by the incumbent. This type of aggressive pricing also 
arises when the incumbent seeks to prevent an existing rival in an adjacent market from   36
capturing part of the incumbent's market. Either way, the incumbent retains his entire 
market only by pricing low enough to preclude sales by actual or potential rivals. 
Exclusion can also take place through strategic product design choices, or through a 
combination of pricing and design choices. Exclusionary own-product improvements 
always raise consumer surplus in our model.  
Once established, the presence of an entrant creates strong incentives for each 
firm to differentiate its product in ways that soften price competition. Greater 
differentiation leads to higher prices for both goods and lower consumer surplus. Thus, 
there is a stronger presumption that entry-induced segmentation leads to higher prices 
once we account for its impact on product design incentives. This point has greater force 
for products like software that exhibit considerable design flexibility.
13 The flexibility 
enables firms to tailor product specifications to appeal more strongly to existing 
customers than to the rival's customers, perhaps by not upgrading the product design 
along dimensions that are relatively highly valued by the rival's customers. 
When technology dictates the path of design changes, a separating equilibrium 
may or may not involve favorable innovation incentives. For example, a firm may forego 
socially beneficial product improvements, even when they are cost free. This outcome is 
more likely when product enhancements are less attractive to the firm's existing 
customers than to its rival's customers. The firm shies away from product improvements 
in this case, because they intensify price competition too much.  It can also be profitable, 
given a fixed innovation path, for the firm to pursue product improvements that lower 
consumer surplus. Ironically, this outcome is more likely when product enhancements are 
relatively attractive to the firm's existing customers. In this case, product improvements 
soften price competition, amplifying the firm's incentive to innovate. 
Entry and potential entry have additional effects on pricing, consumer surplus and 
efficiency in a dynamic setting. For instance, the costs of learning to use a new product 
and other complementary investments create switching costs for consumers. If supply-
side scale economies are also present, then an incumbent can discourage future entry by 
pricing low. A low price expands the incumbent's current customer base and thereby 
soaks up some of the future demand facing a prospective entrant. Product-level network 
                                                           
13 See Davis, MacCrisken and Murphy (2001) on software design flexibility and its implications.   37
effects also give rise to an entry-deterrence motive for low pricing, as analyzed by 
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). 
While potential entry can depress the incumbent's price in a dynamic setting 
through an entry-deterrence motive, actual entry tends to undermine this motive. In an 
environment that will sustain only a few firms, actual entry reduces the scope for further 
entry and thereby relaxes the entry-deterrence motive. We provide examples of this effect 
in Davis, Murphy and Topel (2001b), where we analyze the pricing effects of actual and 
potential entry in a dynamic version of our model with consumer learning by doing. The 
relaxation of the entry-deterrence motive is distinct from the adverse price effects of 
entry analyzed in this paper: market segmentation, retreat from exclusionary pricing, and 
adverse design incentives. All of these effects are potentially important sources of 
upward price pressure in the face of entry into an initially monopolized market. 
Much of our analysis focuses on post-entry incentives to soften price competition 
in a separating equilibrium. Firms accomplish this goal by moving away from each other 
in product space. Prior to entry, however, an incumbent monopolist has at least two 
reasons to design a product with broad consumer appeal. First, a design with broad appeal 
is more likely to substitute closely with a potential entrant's offering. Nearness in product 
space leads to sharper price competition in the post-entry equilibrium. If prior design 
attributes place some limits on later design choice, then a product with broad appeal can 
help the incumbent commit to more intense pricing competition post entry. In turn, the 
prospect of more intense price competition discourages entry. In this way, an incumbent 
design with broad appeal makes entry less attractive.
14 
Second, by raising current unit sales, a design with broad appeal soaks up some of 
an entrant's potential future demand. Thus, given consumer switching costs and supply-
side scale economies, an incumbent design with broad consumer appeal makes it harder 
for an entrant to capture a profitable market presence. Similarly, given network effects on 
the demand side, a design with broad appeal makes it harder for an entrant to obtain a 
toe-hold in the market. In these respects, a design with broad appeal is attractive to the 
                                                           
14 This motive for a product design with broad appeal is similar to the motive for brand proliferation in 
Schmalensee (1978) and Eaton and Lipsey (1979). It is also subject to the qualification stressed by Judd 
(1985): credible entry deterrence rests on incumbent exit costs. In our context, this means the cost of 
retreating from a design with broad appeal.    38
incumbent for the same reason as a low price—both help to soak up the future demand 
for a potential entrant's product. 
In short, potential entry also influences a monopolist's product design decisions. 
Unlike the design incentives induced by actual entry, potential entry encourages the 
incumbent to select designs with broad consumer appeal. For similar reasons, a leading 
firm has strong incentives to innovate in directions that respond to the nascent 
competitive threats posed by potential rivals. “Me-too” enhancements or other suitably 
targeted design improvements by an incumbent can limit the appeal of a potential rival's 
product. As a result, suitably targeted design improvements may enable an incumbent to 
ward off the threats presented by potential rivals, or to deter a potential rival from 
competing directly with the incumbent. Furthermore, insofar as targeted design 
improvements of this sort enable an incumbent monopolist to maintain an exclusionary 
pricing policy, they can be highly beneficial for consumers. Consumers benefit directly 
from better products and indirectly as the product improvement makes it attractive for the 
incumbent to continue pursuing an exclusionary pricing policy. 
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Figure 6. The Opportunity Set 
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Appendix on Multi-Product Monopoly 
 
Proposition 12 (Multi-Product Monopoly): Consider a firm that cooperatively prices 
goods I and E. Without loss of generality, assume that product demand valuations satisfy 
(a) Vh > Vl and (b) Vh - Wh > Vl - Wl. In addition, maintain the following regularity 
assumptions: (c) Vh > Wh, which insures that good E is not strictly superior to good I; (d) 
{} ( ) h h h E I W V N F F − < , max , which restricts the size of fixed operating costs; (e) 
{} 0 , max > l l W V , so that all consumers place a positive value on at least one good; and 
(f) maximal profits are positive. Given these assumptions, the following results 
characterized outcomes under multi-product monopoly. 
A.  (Selling Regimes)  
1.  The firm either segments the market, selling good I to type h and good E to type 
l, or it sells only good I.  
2.  lh WW ≥  is sufficient, but not necessary, for segmentation.  
3.  When the firm sells good I only, it sells to all consumers if () h l V V > +λ 1  and to 
type h only, otherwise. 
B.  (Pricing and Consumer Surplus)  
1. When  lh WW ≥ , the firm prices at 
M
I P  = Vh and 
M
E P  = Wl , and it extracts all 
consumer surplus. 
2. When  Wl < Wh, and the firm segments the market, it prices at 
M
I P  = Vh + Wl - 
Wh and  l
M
E W P = . Consumer surplus equals  () l h h W W N − . 
3.  When the firm sells good I only, it prices at 
M
I P  = Vl if () h l V V ≥ +λ 1 and 
M
I P  = 
Vh, otherwise. Consumer surplus equals  () l h h V V N −  in the former case and 
zero in the latter case. 
C.  (Allocative Efficiency) 
1.  When the firm segments the market, the allocation of goods to consumers is 
efficient if  ll WV ≥  and inefficient, otherwise.   49
2.  When the firm sells good I to all consumers, the allocation of goods to 
consumers is efficient. 
3.  When the firm sells good I only to type h only, the allocation is inefficient. 
D.  (Design Incentives) 
1.  If (i) the allocation is efficient, or (ii) the firm does not segment the market, 
than any marginal design change that raises profit also raises total surplus. If 
neither (i) nor (ii) hold, then some profitable design changes raise total surplus 
and others lower it. 
2.  When consumer surplus is positive, some profitable design changes raise 
consumer surplus and others lower it. 
 
Proof: 
Parts A and B: If the firm segments the market, condition (b) implies that it sells 
I to h and E to l. If  lh WW ≥  and the firm segments the market, it maximizes profit by 
pricing at the boundary point B in Figure 6, where 
M
I P  = Vh and 
M
E P  = Wl.  Since these 
prices extract all consumer surplus, the firm can do no better. Thus,  lh WW ≥  is sufficient 
for segmentation with prices 
M
I P  = Vh and 
M
E P  = Wl. 
Next, consider the situation when Wl < Wh. If the firm segments the market, it 
prices at the boundary point A in Figure 6, where 
M
I P  = Vh + Wl - Wh and 
M
E P  = Wl. In 




I h W W N W P N V P N − = − + − . With 
segmentation (and optimal pricing),  () ( ) E I l l h l h h
M F F W N W W V N Both − − + − + = π . 
With sales of good I only,  () ( ) {} I h h I l l h
M F V N F V N N I − − + = , max π .  With sales of 
good E only,  () ( ) {} E h h E l l h
M F W N F W N N E − − + = , max π . Using condition (c), these 
profit expressions imply that sales of good E to type-h only is dominated by selling good 
I to type-h only. Using condition (d),  () Both
M π  exceeds the profit from selling good E 
only to both types. Thus, selling good E only is dominated. 
To show that segmentation may or may not maximize profits when Wl < Wh, use 
the profit expressions to compute outcomes in the following examples:    50
Example (i): Let Vh = 100, Vl = 12, Wh = 10, Wl = 8, Nh = Nl = 1 and FI = FE = 0. The 
profit-maximizing outcome involves segmentation with 
M
I P  = 98 and 
M
E P  = 8. 
Type h buys I, and type l buys E. This allocation of goods to consumers is 
inefficient, because good I is strictly superior to good E. Consumer surplus is 2, 
and profit is 106. 
Example (ii): Same parameter values as in (i), except that Wh = 50. The profit-
maximizing outcome involves sales of good I at price 
M
I P  = 100 to type h only. 
Good E is not sold. The allocation of goods to consumers is inefficient. Consumer 
surplus is 0, and profit is 100. 
Examples (i) and (ii) establish that the multi-product monopolist may or may not segment 
the market when Wl < Wh, depending on other parameter values. Together with examples 
(i) and (ii), the next two examples can be used to show that all of the results stated in 
Proposition 12 are non-vacuous. 
Example (iii): Same parameter values as in (i), except that Vl = 60. The profit-
maximizing outcome involves sales of good I to both types at price 
M
I P  = 60. The 
allocation is efficient. Consumer surplus is 40, and profit is 120. 
Example (iv): Same parameters as in (i), except that Wl = 20. The profit-maximizing 
outcome involves segmentation with prices 
M
I P  = 100 and 
M
E P  = 20. Type h 
buyer I, and type l buys E. The allocation of goods to consumers is efficient, 
because Vh > Wh and Vl < Wl. Consumer surplus is zero, and profit is 120. 
Putting the pieces together, the firm either segments the market, sells good I to 
type h only, or sells good I to both types. Using the expression for  () I
M π , a firm that 
sells good I only sells to all consumers if () h l V V ≥ +λ 1  and to type h only, otherwise. 
The consumer surplus expressions when the firm sells good I only follow immediately. 
Part C: (1) Making use of condition (c), the proof follows straightforwardly for 
the segmentation case. (2) If the firm sells I to all consumers, then 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) l l E h h h l l l h
M M W V F W V N W V N N Both I > ⇒ > − − ≥ − + ⇒ ≥ 0 π π , making use 
of condition (d). But, if Vl > Wl and Vh > Wh (condition (c)), then it is efficient to allocate 
good I to all consumers. (3) If the firm sells I only to h only, the allocation is inefficient   51
because type-l consumers place a positive value on at least one good (condition (e)). 
Examples (i)-(iv) above establish that these efficiency results are non-vacuous. 
Part D: (1) By part C, an efficient allocation implies that  lh WW ≥  or that the firm 
sells good I to all consumers. When  lh WW ≥ , part B.1 implies that profitable design 
improvements also raise total surplus. When the firm sells good I to all consumers part 
B.3 implies the same conclusion. By part A, if the firm does not segment the market, it 
sells good I only. When it sells good I only, part B.3 again implies the conclusion. The 
only remaining possibility involves segmentation with Wl < Wh. By part B.2, marginal 
increases in Vh and Wl raise both profits and total surplus in this case, whereas marginal 
increases in Wh lower profits and raise total surplus. (2) The result follows directly from 
parts B.2 and B.3. 
 
 Discussion: 
Proposition 12 gives two simple conditions that suffice for an efficient allocation 
under multi-product monopoly. First,  {} h l l W V W , max ≥  implies segmentation with an 
efficient allocation. Second, if Wl < Wh, the allocation is also efficient whenever the 
monopolist sells good I to both types. Hence, multi-product monopoly leads to efficient 
allocations for a large region in the space of design parameters. 
Different market structures give rise to a misallocation of goods in different 
regions of the parameter space. Hence, it is not possible to uniformly rank alternative 
market structures – monopoly versus two competing firms – by the criterion of allocative 
efficiency or total surplus. More surprisingly, consumer surplus can be greater under 
monopoly than with two competing firms. As an example, consider the following 
parameters values: Vh = 9, Vl = 5, Nh =  Nl = 1, FI = FE = 0, Wh = 2 and Wl = 1.75.  Given 
these values, one can use Proposition 1 and the formulas in the proof to Proposition 12 to 
show that multi-market monopoly yields greater consumer (and total surplus) than the 
two-firm market structure. 
Proposition 12 also says that product design incentives are often positively 
aligned with total surplus under multi-product monopoly. That is, the profit derivatives 
with respect to marginal design changes have the same sign pattern as the total surplus 
derivatives.  The monopolist’s marginal design incentives are always in the direction of   52
raising total surplus when the allocation is efficient, and sometimes when the allocation is 
inefficient.       
When Wl < Wh, and the monopolist sells both goods, Part B.2 of the theorem 
implies that the monopolist has an incentive to lower Wh. Here, Wh is the value that type-
h consumers ascribe to the good that they do not purchase. Lowering Wh allows the 
monopolist to raise the price on sales of good I to type-h consumers. This is the same 
effect that underlies adverse design incentives in the separating equilibrium with two 
firms. However, the effect is weaker under multi-product monopoly in two respects. First, 
the incentive for quality degradation arises in a smaller region of the parameter space 
under multi-product monopoly. Second, even in that region, the monopolist benefits from 
quality degradation in only one, not two, directions. 
The case of innovation along a fixed path also involves less scope for adverse 
incentives under multi-market monopoly. To see this point, note again that the 
monopolist has no design degradation motive except under segmentation with Wl < Wh. 
Even in this case, part B.2 of Proposition 12 implies that innovation in good I is 
profitable for the monopolist for any value of  h l V V ∆ ∆ , in sharp contrast to the situation 
with two firms. Innovation in good E is profitable for the monopolist if 
λ + < ∆ ∆ 1 l h W W , which is identical to the corresponding condition in Proposition 7.A 
that applies in the two-firm separating equilibrium. 
In summary, adverse design incentives are less prevalent in the space of design 
parameters under multi-product monopoly than with two competing firms. Moreover, the 
multi-product monopolist has a motive for product degradation along at most one 
direction. In contrast, the two-firm market structure gives rise to motives for product 
degradation along two directions at any interior separating equilibrium. 